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The concept of a leader is one ofthe most fundamental to the study of collective
behavior. It is also one of the most poorly theorized, primarily because social
movement theorists continue to (1) assume that leaders must be affiliated with an
organization and (2) argue over who "counts" as a leader. This paper offers two
alternative approaches. I argue, first, that our current conceptualization must be
broadened to include individuals who are unaffiliated with an organization.
Second, I suggest that rather than debating who qualifiesand does not qualify as
a movement leader, we would do better totake an interpretive approach to the
study of leadership; that is, we should treat as a leader any individual who is '•
• perceived as one ^ beit by the public, the media, politicians, or other movement i..,
•^-s' ' participants. These two approacheswill resultin a much fuller theoretical picture
of movement leaders.
One of the most fundamental concepts in social movement theory
is that of a leader.The importance of leaders to movements seems
self-evident. Leaders inspire, motivate, and sometimes directly
organize a movement's participants; they represent and frame a
movement's messages and goals; they mobilize resources, and
create and exploit opportunities; finaüy, they publicly shoulder the
responsibility for the movement's outcomes, successes, and
faüures. Leaders, in short, often personify their movement. Indeed,
it is nearly impossible to think of a major social or revolutionary
movement in world history without simultaneouslythinking
aboutthe leader, or leaders, who spearheaded it.AsAldonMorris
(2000: 451) has put it:
[Leadership] deserves a central place in movement theorizing because it
interjects human agency into coüective action and affects the mobilization and
outcomes of movements. Thus a major task of movement theory is to unpack
the Ijlack box' of movement leadership so that we can develop more robust
models of how coüective action emerges and is sustained.
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Understanding leaders, in other words, is crucial to understanding
the trajectory ofmovements—and to advancing social movement
theory.
As important as leadership is to understanding social
movements, it is woefully undertheorized, as scholars have
recently begim to point out. We know much less than we should
about how leaders rise, the ways in which they interact with one
another, and how they infiuence the emergence, existence, and
decline of movements (cf., Amir^zade et al 2001; Ganz 2004; Morris
2000; Morris and Staggenborg 2004; Schussman and Earl 2004). Two
shortcomings are particularly problematic: a narrow
conceptualization of leadership, which insists that leaders must be
affiliated with a social movement organization (SMO), and an
equally narrow definition of who "counts" as a movement leader,
which includes only those individuals whom movement scholars
have judged to be leaders.This paper attempts a fuller theory of
leadership by highlighting and offering alternatives to both.
It is important to point out from the beginning that there are
good reasons for movement analysts'failure to adequately theorize
social movement leadership. Clifford Bob (2005:46) recently
pointed to one of them: "Scholars often downplay the role of
individuals, instead highlighting historical or economic trends as
key sources of change." This approach is, of course, especially
prevalent among sociologists, who typically highlight the
structural and cultural rather than the biographical. Morris and
Staggenborg (2004: 171) offer a second reason for
sociologists'inadequate conceptualization of leadership; namely, "a
failure to fully integrate agency and structure in theories of social
movements." They succinctlystate the dilemma faced by scholars
who study leaders: "A focus on great leaders risks neglect of
structiiral opportimities and obstacles to collective action, while an
emphasis on structures of opportunity risks slighting human
agency" (p. 171). Theorizing movement leadership, then, has not
been an easy task.
The Organizational Basis of Movement Leadership
When they have not ignored it altogether, American sociologists
have viewed the study of movement leadership quite narrowly
over the past four decades; that is, through the lens of resource
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mobilization (RM) theory.^  Our reliance on RM theory has caused
us to focus almost exclusively on leaders who are affiliated with
social movement organizations (SMOs); that is, formal, titled,
"ofticial" leaders (Bob and Nepstad 2007). Leaders and activists
who have operated independently of any SMO have been almost
completely ignored in the past 40 years' worth of research on social
and revolutionary movements.
Sociologists' undue emphasis on the organizational aspect of
leadership was established in the early 1970s. Before the
ascendance of resource mobilization at that time, scholars of social
and revolutionary movements held a much more nuanced view of
movement leaders.Rex Hopper (1950), for example, differentiated
among two types of agitator, as well as the prophet, the reformer, the
statesman, and the administrator-executive. Each of these five general
types of leader. Hopper argued, was more or less prominent during
each of his four theorized stages of a revolutionary movement, and
each fulfilled a very different function.
Rudolph Heberle (1951) distingiüshed movement/eaders from
officials or functionaries. The primary difference between them is that
the latter hold an office while the former need not. As a result, the
official's authority is institution-based; that is,
obedience is due to persons exercising the authority of office only by virtue of
the formal legaHty of their commands and only within the scope of authority
of the office. The prototype of this kind of authority wielder in social
movements is the elected officer . . . on all levels of the organization. (Heberle
1951:288)
Regardless of officers' personal abilities and skills, "the degree of
authority which they exercise legitimately is determined by
statutes defining the functions of their offices" (Heberle 1951: 288).
By contrast, movement leaders may or may not hold an office.
Heberle (1951: 287, emphasis added) thought it better to reserve the
term "for those individuals who, whether they hold an office or not,
take the lead in group action . . . " Rather than exercising what
Weber called "rational" authority, leaders' authority is of the
charismatic type. This distinction, which Heberle outlined more
than a half-century ago, between leaders and officials remains
important because it allowed movement scholars to apply to social
movements Weber's (1947) discussion of the types of legitimate
authority. With the rise of resource mobilization tiieory, we erased
242 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF MODERN SOQOLOGY
the difference between those movement leaders who hold an office
in an organization and those who do not; doing so also effectively
erasedWeber's crucial distinction between rational and charismatic
authority.
Drawing on both Hopper's (1950) and Heberle's (1951) work,
Lewis KiUian (1964: 440) could accurately claim as late as the mid-
1960s that "there is general agreement that different types of
leaders are involved [in a social movement]." KiUian (1964: 441-43)
himself described three broad categories of leader: the charismatic,
the administrative, and the inteUectual. Unfortunately, subsequent
scholars, riding the wave of resource mobUization, focused solely
on KilUan's administrative leader—an individual who is concerned
primarily with "the mechanics of orgarüzation, finances, and
diplomacy" (p. 442). The charismatic and inteUectual leadership
types.were quickly forgotten, and thus the nuances of leadership
were glossed over.
It was just two years after KilUan's (1964)' work thatZald and
Ash (1966) pubUshed their classic article about the growth, decay,
and change of social movement organizations. By highUghting the
importance to movements of resources and organizations, the
authors not only gave birth to resource mobiUzation theory, but
introduced the narrow conceptualization of movement leadership
that dominates the literature to this day (see, especiaUy, pp. 338-9).
McCarthy and Zald's (1977, 1973) subsequent statements of RM
theory, which emphasized even more strongly the importance of
movement organizations, soUdified the notion that one cannot, by
definition, be a movement leader if one is not part of a movement's
formal organizational structure.
AldoiiMorris's (1984: 279) weU-known study of the civil rights
movement, for example, suggested that "[Martin Luther] King and
other charismatic leaders faciUtated the mobiUzation of the
movement because they had both organizational backing and
charisma . . . [and] demonstrated that in the civu rights movement
charisma and organization were conjoined from the very beginning
and were mutuaUy reinforcing." Charisma, in other words, was not
enough for leaders to mobüize the movement; Dr. King and other
leaders also needed organizational support. That is, they needed to
be officiaUy recognized by at least one SMO as formal, visible, titled
spokes people.
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DougMcAdam (1982) had, in fact, concluded two years prior to
Morris' (1984) stiady that the civil rights movement's leaders came
from three organizations in particular: black churches, colleges and
universities, and local chapters of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). McAdam, like Morris
(1984) two years later, left notheoretical room for leaders who did
not emerge from one of these three organizations. Part of the
problem was that he relied orüy on "descriptive accounts of the
various direct action campaigns conducted during the early years
of the movement" in analyzing the movement's leadership
patterns (p. 133). By McAdam's own admission, his list of leaders is
incomplete: "No claim is made that this table [which lists
indigenous leaders] is exhaustive" (p. 133).
More importantiy, McAdam writes: "Nor was any effort made
to verify the accuracy of designating any of these individuals as
leaders" (p. 133). Aside from the obvious methodological
shortcoming this represents, McAdam imintentionally highlights a
major problem with our decades-old conceptualization of
leadership; namely, that it has relied, simply and solely, on a
researcher's own judgment about who "counts" as a leader. It is no
wonder that McAdam described as "remarkable" the "absence of
leaders independent of the three institutions" (p. 133), for the
accounts that he used as his orüy data source "leave little doubt as
to the dominant leadership role played by individuals drawn from
these three institiitions" (p. 133). As a result, McAdam was forced
to conclude that leaders who were independent of these
institutions simply did not exist.
Elaborating on the RM perspective a few years after McAdam
(1982) and Morris (1984), Suzanne Staggenborg (1988: 586;
emphasis added) also focused solely on "types of leadership in
SMOs" of the pro-choice movement, without ever considering the
possible existence of any types of leadership outside of the
movement's SMOs. She distinguished among three types of SMO
leader: professional managers (paid movement careerists),
volunteer leaders (who are not paid), and non professional staff
leaders (who may or may not be paid, but are not movement
careerists). Staggenborg (1988: 587, emphasis added) casually
noted that all three were "by definition, involved in organizational
decision making." This tautological argument has organizational
244 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF MODERN SOCIOLOGY
bias at its heart: If one is orüy looking at leaders of organizations,
then naturaüy one wiü conclude that these same leaders, by
definition, are involved in organizational decision-making.^
It woiüd not be untü two decades after the rise of RM theory
thata handful of sociologistsfinally began to question this narrow
conceptualization of leadership as being biased toward formal
organizations (cf., Buechler 1993). The general critique offered by
this verysmall body of work was that social movement leaders are
not always or necessarüy formal, titled, "official" spokes persons—
a fact that was clearly understood, by Hopper (1950), Heberle
(1951), Külian (1964) and others in the previous generation of social
movement scholars. Irorúcaüy, the researchers who leveled this
criticism during the 1990s left their own work open to it.
Bamett (1993), for example, demonstirated that black women
had been ignored in discussions of civü rights movement
leadership. She argued that scholars of the civü rights movement
had typicaüy focused on elite professionals within the movement,
such as nunisters, and on elite supporters from outside the
movement. They had also,she maintained, emphasized the
importance of three groups of male leaders—"orgarúzation heads-
political leaders," "Young Turks-shock troops," and
"revolutionaries-separatists"—almost every single one of whom
was affiliated with civü rights SMOs (e.g., the NAACP, the
Congress of Racial Equality [CORE], the Black Panthers, the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference [SCLC], and the Black
Muslims). Bamett, by contrast, pointed to numerous black women
who played important leadership roles in the civü rights
movement. As insightfvü as Bamett's study continues to be, it is, in
my view, guüty of the same bias toward formal orgaiûzations that
had marked earlier work: Nearly au of the female leaders Bamett
used as examples of "orgarúzation heads-political leaders," "Yoimg
Turks-shock troops," and "revolutionaries-separatists" were
affiliated with one or more of the movement's formal organizations
(Bamett 1993: 178).
Belinda Robnett (1997, 1996) attempted to overcome this
problem by focusing on women in the civü rights movement who
acted as "bridge leaders." She demonstrated that women in the
movement were often steered away from formal leadership
positions, solely because of their gender. These women had no
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choice but to take on informal leadership roles. Specifically, they
became "bridges" between "the formal orgarüzation and adherents
and potential constitiients" (1996: 1667). Like Barnett (1993),
however, Robnett's examples were, by her own admission, all
connected to—and usually members of—the movement's formal
organizations: "The activities of African-American women in the
civil rights movement provided the bridges necessary to cross
boundaries between the personal Uves of potential constituents
and adherents and the political life of civil rights movement
organizations" (1996: 1664). The bias toward leaders who were
connected to SMOs continued.
At about the same time, Herda-Rapp (1998: 343) argued that the
vast majority of social movement theory conceptualized leadership
in a way that "disregards extraorganizational leadership and the
nuances of informal leadership." She was imdoubtedly correct. But
her case study of Hattie Kendrick's role in the U.S. civil rights
movement seemed to negate her own argument. Eor one, Kendrick
began as a "visible formal" leader who was affiliated with an SMO,
becoming an "informal, extra-organizational and autonomous"
leader orüy later in her career. Second, Herda-Rapp used the
example of Hattie Kendrick to expand Robnett's (1996) concept of a
"bridge leader"; that is, she considered Kendrick a leader who was
"engaged in micromobiHzation, linking the local community to the
movement organization and its leadership in a one-on-one
interactive style" (Herda-Rapp 1998: 344). Hattie Kendrick,
according to Herda-Rapp's interpretation, served as a bridge not
only between the movement's formal leaders and the community,
but also between the formal leaders themselves and between
movement generations.
Toward an Interpretive Understanding of Leadership: Dr. Jack
Kevorkian as a Leader of the Right-to-die Movement
Over the past two decades, movement scholars—even those who
have attempted to critique the bias toward organizational
leadership—have typically operated imder the assumption that
leaders must be formally associated with a movement organization
(see also, e.g., Effier 2010; Jasper 1997; Stevens 2001).^  By doing so,
they have repeated the mistake made by their predecessors. This
section makes a case for defining a movement leader not solely as
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someone who is tieated as a leader by a particular scholar, or as
someone who is affiliated with an SMO, but simply as someone who
is perceived as a leader.
My primary example is Dr. Jack Kevorkian and the American
right-to-die (RTD) movement, but I could have used any number of
historical figures to make the argument that foUows: T. E. Lawrence
(or "Lawrence of Arabia") and so-called "spiritual leaders" Hke the
Dalai Lama spring immediately to rründ. There are many others, as
we will see in the concluding section. I offer no special reason for
focusing on Kevorkian, other than the fact that he, and the
movement he led for nearly a decade, have been aU but ignored by
social movement scholars.
Eirst, what is a leader? Morris and Staggenborg (2004:171), two
experts on the role of leadership in movements,recently offered the
following definition of leaders: "strategic decision-makers who
inspire and organize others to participate in social movements."
Using this as a working definition, the next question that arises is:
Was Jack Kevorkian, in fact, a leader of the RTD movement?
On one hand, Kevorkian certainly made strategic decisions,
such as assisting in two suicides just two weeks before the
November 1991 vote on Washington state's ül-fated Initiative 119.
These two assisted deaths, according to the most authoritative
historian of the right-to-die movement, "likely helped to scuttle" I-
119, the passage of which woiüd have legalized euthanasia
(Dowbiggin 2003: 167). Kevorkian also inspired others to
participate, directly and iridirectly, in the RTD movement, whether
through protesting or actually carrying out the assisted suicides of
loved ones. One of the first, and certairily the most famous, of these
cases was that of Bertram and Virginia Harper. The elderly couple
fiew to Michigan "for the specific purpose of allowing the wife to
commit suicide, in the belief that the Michigan authorities would
respond lerüently" ("Michigan Charging Murder After a 2d
Assisted Suicide" 1990). Why did the Harpers hold such a belief?
Because they had "leam[ed] from news accounts on the Kevorkian
case [of Janet Adkins] that the state had no law that specifically bars
helping a person comrrüt smcide" ("Michigan Charging Murder
After a 2d Assisted Suicide" 1990). In other words, the Harpers
drew their inspiration directly from the news of Kevorkian's
assistance in Adkins' suicide nearly three months earlier; the
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Adkins case was what prompted 69-year-old Virginia Harper, who
was suffering from breast cancer, to take sleeping piUs and puU a
plastic bag over her head at the Comfort Inn in Romulus, MI, in the
presence of her 72-year-old husband (who was subsequently
charged with murder) and their daughter (who was not charged).
(Dn the other hand, and in spite of aU this, what Kevorkian did
not do was directlyorganize others' participation in the RTD
movement. Thus, according to Morris and Staggenborg (2004), as
weU as most other movement scholars since the early 1970s, he
simply does not quaUfy as a movement leader. But here, again, we
see the bias toward organizations among social movement Ü\eorists
regarding who qualifies, from movement theorists' perspective, as a
"leader."
But why must one directly organize others to be considered a
movement leader? Responding to Robnett's (1997) argument that
leaders need not fiU "formal" roles in an SMO, Morris and
Staggenborg (2004) offer two reasons: They "worry that this Une of
analysis could lead to an overly broad definition of leadership and
to [the] neglect of power dynamics in movement leadership"
(Morris and Staggenborg 2004: 177). To the contrary, I have
suggested that our definition of leadership needs to be broadened;
it is much too narrow to encompass the range of movement
leadership tj^es. And, regarding Morris and Staggenborg's (2004)
second concem, social movement theorists have traditionaUy done
a poor job of studying power d3mamics among movement leaders
(Aminzade, Goldstone, and Perry 2001), so we have nothing to lose
on this front.
Morris and Staggenborg (2004: 177) are also reluctant to
"coUapse the distinction between formal leadership and movement
spokespersons." The reason is simple: Individuals whom they define
as "formal movement leaders"—Lenin, Gandhi, Mao, and the
like—"set movement goals, determined strategies and tactics, and
shaped outcomes." Movement spokespersons, on the other hand,
"may put themselves forward or are selected by the mass media as
'stars' but are not accountable leaders at aU" (p. 177). But theydo not
consider the possibUity that an individual may simultaneously
occupy the statuses of leader and spokesperson.
Dr. Kevorkian neither set the RTD movement's goals nor
determined its strategies and tactics, but he certainly shaped its
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outcomes. He also became an vmaccountable media "star" in the
process. So does he qualify as a formal leader? Or was he more of a
spokesperson? I do not claim to know the definitive answer to
either question. What I do know is that drawing the boundary so
definitively and so rigidly between leaders, spokespersons, and
everyone else, as Morris and Staggenborg (2004) attempt to do, is
more likely to stifle theoretical developments in our approach to
movement leadership than it is to lead to a fuller understanding of
the nature of movement leadership.^
Clifford Bob and Sharon Nepstad (2007) recently offered a
conceptualization of leadership that is very different—and much
more general—than Morris and Staggenborg's (2004). Bob and
Nepstad (2007) define as a leader any individual who simply
"exercise[s] significant authority within a movement" (p. 1373).
Such a person is "acknowledged by the movement itself, third
parties, the media, and opponents as its 'leader.' This may be
because of the resources he or she wields, the numbers of
followershe or she commands, his or her symbolic importance to
the movement, or other reasons" (p. 1373). By this definition. Jack
Kevorkian clearly does qualify as a leader of the RTD movement^
precisely because Bob and Nepstad (2007) do not insist on the
organizational requirement and because they take an interpretive
approach to leadership; that is, they leave it up to various groups to
decide who they recognize as a leader rather than assuming that
scholars can and should make that judgment themselves.
The point in all of this is that movement theorists' subjective
judgments of who counts, and who does not count, as a leader of a
social movement contain more than a little bias—a bias toward
direct organizing and toward/ormfl/ organizations that is a remnant of
the dominance of the resource mobuization approach during the
1970s and 80s. I suggest that instead of "objectively" defining and
identifying leaders based on whether they organize others, or
whether they inspire others, or whether they attract resources, we
define and identify leaders based on a simpler criterion: whether
they are perceived as leaders. In other words, I suggest that we
attempt an interpretive understanding of movement leadership.
This is not a novel argument. Heberle (1951: 133, emphasis
added) wrote the foUowing about movement leadership 60 years
ago: "Most social movements show . . . the phenomenon of the
TOWARD AN INTERPRETIVE APPROACH TO SOCIAL MOVEMENT LEADERSHIP 249
great personal leader, the great speUbinder and agitator. These men
. . . do not intend to be personal leaders, but, to the masses, they
symbolize the cause for which they are living." Not orüy does he make
no mention of organizations, but he points to the importance of an
interpretive approach to leadership. Throughout the discussion
that foüows, it is crucial to keep in mind ihatwhether an individual
fits our theoretical models of movement leadership is muchless important
than whether that individual is perceived as a leader.
There can be no doubt that between 1990 and 1999, Jack
Kevorkian symboHzed the right-to-die and, as I demonstrate below,
was perceived as a leader of the American RTD movement by four
different groups: (1) the general pubHc, (2) "official" and "formal"
RTD movement leaders, and (3) poUticians.
The Public. A smiling, almost nortchalant Jack Kevorkian
appeared on the cover of Time magazine in May 1993; he made
appearances on television programs like Donahue and 60 Minutes;
he was the subject of op-ed pieces, newspaper cartoons, and
popular jokes; "Kevorkianism" and "Kevorkianesque" entered the
poptüar lexicon. Dr. Kevorkian quickly became, and then
remained, quite literaüy, the face of the RTD movement as far as the
public was concemed. Poüsters, of course, were among the first to
pick up on Kevorkian's celebrity, and they responded accordingly.
Gaüup, the National Opinion Research Center, Roper, and a host of
other national polling firms regtüarly devoted questionnaire items
specifically to Jack Kevorkian. They did not do the same for Derek
Humphry or any of the movement's other "official" leaders. And
their focus on Kevorkian served both to establish his leadership
and to reinforce his status as a leader in the eyes of the public.
The mass media's role in Kevorkian's rise to the status of
movement leader cannot be overemphasized. As Todd Gitlin (2003)
argued, the media have the power to make and break both
movements and their leaders. Rather than abdicating his celebrity
status, as some New Left leaders like Staughton Lynd, Mario Savio,
and Robert Moses did (Gitlin 2003: 176-78), Kevorkian successfuüy
"pyramided" it — that is, he used it to buüd up a cache of celebrity
(see Gitlin 2003:166). With each new media appearance, his celebrity
and his leadership were reinforced and further legitimated in the
eyes of the public (see also Gaüey 2003). Kevorkian undoubtedly
personified the RTD movement during the 1990s.
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The RTD Movement's Established Leadership. The "official" and
"formal" leadership of the RTD movement—that is, the leaders
who were affiliated with the movement's SMOs—also recognized
Kevorkian's leadership role. A press release published by the
Hemlock Society in October 1989 called Kevorkian "a brave
pioneer", and the founder of Michigan's Hemlock chapter lent
strong support to him (Dowbiggin 2003:166). Derek Humphry and
Ann Wickett (1986: 137), the co-foimders of the Hemlock Society,
summed up Kevorkian's contribution to the movement in this way:
" . . . it cannot be denied that his has been the most sigrûficant
impact on death in the U.S. in this century. Few others have
possessed the cotirage, determination, and integrity to accomplish
what he has done."
The judgments from formal RTD leaders were not always
flattering. Derek Humphry (1992: 40) famously referred to
Kevorkian as a "loose cannon", which implied that he was a rogue
activist who was unable to be restrained by any organization. In fact,
an executive director of another prominent RTD SMO, Compassion
in Dying, called Kevorkian "'a rogue doctor who should be thrown
in jail'" (quoted in Eox et al 1999:129). Interestingly, it was precisely
during the tim.es that official movement leaders condemned
Kevorkian that rank-and-file members rose to his defense. Derek
Humphry's "loose cannon" comment, for example, brought public
protests from several Hemlock Society chapters and published
letters supporting Kevorkian.
Politicians. A number of politicians and other public officials
also indirectly recognized Kevorkian's leadership in the RTD
movement when they sought to pass legislation banning his
"suicide machine", assisted suicide, or even the doctor himself. The
first and most outspoken was Michigan State Senator Ered
Dillingham, who introduced a bill shortly after Janet Adkins' death
that made assisting in a suicide a felony. He feared that Michigan
would quickly become "a haven, the place to go" for people who
wished to kQl themselves (Schmidt 1990). The penalty for doing so,
under Dillingham's proposal, was up to four years in prison and a
fine of up to $2,000 (Schmidt 1990). Dillingham seemed to take
Kevorkian's actions personally: "My feeling is we need to punch
Kevorkian's lights out right now," he said. "He's proven himself to
be a danger" (Wilkerson 1991).
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The Governor of Michigan, John Engler, also wanted to put a
stop to Kevorkian's crusade, which, by the summer of 1992, had left
four bodies in its wake. Before Michigan "become[s] known as the
smcide state," as Governor Engler put it in May 1992, he asked that
a bill before the State Legislature be sped up. The bill would forbid
anyone from helping another person commit suicide ("Kevorkian
Provided the Gas for Woman's Suicide" 1992). Governor Engler
signed the bul on Eebruary 27, 2003, and took the opportunity to
publicly denounce Kevorkian's actions as "murder," and to vow to
prosecute the doctor if he helped anyone die after the law took
effect. "I want to sign it today as a protest to what Mr. Kevorkian
has done," he said. In the typical rhetoric of politicians, Engler
continued: "The methods of Mr. Jack Kevorkian, and I stiess 'Mr.'
since his License to practice medicine has been suspended [in
Michigan], are wrong because he has deliberately fiouted the law
and taken it upon himself to be his own judge, jury, and executioner
in Michigan." Michigan State Senator Douglas Carl, who voted for
the law, added: "We can't have somebody marching around
preying on depressed people who think they may be hopelessly ill.
We can't have somebody going around indiscriminately snuffing
out people's lives" (Smith 1993). Erom Michigan's State Senate to its
Governor's Mansion, then, public officials singled out Kevorkian
as the leader of the movement for the right to die.
Reconceptualizing Movement Leadership
Even though I have used him as my primary example of a leader
that does not fit our current conceptualization of leadership. Jack
Kevorkian was not a tinique type of movement leader. History
offers plenty of examples of individuals who were widely
perceived and tieated as leadersofmass movements but were never
affiliated with any formal orgarüzation; Tenzin Gyatso (the current
Dalai Lama) is a current example. T E. Lawrence (or "Lawrence of
Arabia")' also comes to mind, as do many of the leaders of the
American independence movement. Indeed, in describing himself
as the anonymous author of Common Sense, Thomas Paine wrote the
following in the pamphlet's Intioduction: "he is unconnected with
any Party, and under no sort of Influence public or private, but the
influence of reason and principle" (Paine 1997: 2). These are hardly
the words of a man who is affiliated with, or holds membership in.
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an organization of any kind. Paine, Washington, Jefferson,
Madison, Frai\klin—the list of organizationaUy unaffiUated leaders
of the American Revolution is as long as it is distinguished.^ A
conceptuaUzation of leadership that omits historical giantsand
contemporary cultural icons such as these is at best incomplete, and
at worst invaUd.
Incorporating the organizationaUy unaffiUated into our
theories about, and conceptualizations of, movement leadership
has at least two major benefits. First, if we hope to arrive at a full
understanding of movement leadership, we simply
cannotcontinue to studyonly "formal" and"official" leaders who
are affiUated with estabUshed SMOs. I share Morris and
Staggenborg's (2004: 177) concem about "retain[ing] any analytic
meaning for the concept of leadership," but they beUeve that
maintaining a narrow definition of leadership is the way to do so.
As I have argued here, I beUeve that we must broaden our definition
of a social movement leader if we are to thoroughly understand the
various t3^es of leadership—^both within and outside of SMOs—
under which movements coalesce and move forward. We must
include the informal, the unofficial, the unaffiUated—any
individual, in short, who is widely thought of as a leader.
For example, in an important new line of inquiry into
movements that emerge online, or "e-movements". Earl and
Schussman (2003) showed that website managers and concept.
designers in the strategic votingmovementwere not at aU
constrained by the kinds of organizational pressures that
movement scholars have traditionaUy pointed to. A related piece of
research by the same authors concluded that "movement
leadership need not be predicated on poUtical experience or activist
training"; in other words, "leadership can be generated by a set of
conditions that are broader than prior research suggests"
(Schussman and Earl (2004: 459). Restricting ourselves to
organizationally affiUated leaders wiU lead to the stagiiation of
theorizing about leadership.
A second benefit of broadening our conceptualization of
movement leadership is a deeper understanding of the
relationships among individual leaders. As Aminzade, Goldstone,
and Perry (2001: 126) have pointed out, "[s]urprisingly Uttle
scholarship . . . has sought to determine the effect that variation in
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leadership dynamics . . . have [sic] on the course and outcomes of
contentious poUtics." One scholar's book or another's paper about
one particular movement leader might be interesting and
informative, but it inevitably ignores that particular leader's
relationship with other leaders.^
Every social movement is led by rnore than one person, and the
American RTD movement during the 1990s was no different. To
insist that orüy Jack Kevorkian is worthy of our attention is to teU
only part of the RTD movement's story. As the founder and director
of the movement's largest SMO, the Hemlock Society, Derek
Humphry was also a recognized leader of the movement. Thesetwo
men forged a relationship, however tenuous, over the course of a
decade, and the changing nature of that relationship had clear and
direct effects on the RTD movement's trajectory during that time.
The problem, then, which Aminzade, Goldstone, and Perry (2001)
recently highlighted, becomes one of examining the relationships
among a movement's recognized leaders, and the consequences
those relationships have for the course and outcome of a
movement. But if such an analysis were to focus only on
organizationally affiliated leaders of the RTD movement,
Kevorkian would be left out altogether and we would miss a crucial
aspect of the movement's life-course during the 1990s; namely, the
relationship between its two most important leaders.
Conclusion
This article set out to accomplish two goals. Eirst, it sought to make
a general argument for an interpretive understanding of social
movement leadership. In the process, it made the case for a
conceptualization of leadership that includes organizationally
unaffiliated leaders. We simply cannot continue to decide for
ourselves who qualifies as a leader and who does not. As I have
shown, that approach leads to ignoring some of the most important
movement leaders in world history. In the interests of advancing
social movement theory and of arriving at a fuller understanding of
the nature of movements, we must assume an interpretive
approach; that is, we must subordinate our own judgments to those
of the public and the media. We must also look beyond
organizations for the leaders of social movements. Eor some of the
most consequential figures in human history did not belong tQ any
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formal group, either as a leader or as a member. They were, rather,
individuals who sought, and ultimately effected, social change—
only without the support and resources of an organization. Perhaps
they, if only because they are often thought of as mavericks and
outsiders and rogues, are the movement leaders who are most
deserving of our scholarly attention.
Notes
1. Sociologists have often treated movement leaders as a "given"—in other
words, as people that are simply assumed to be there and to be important; or,
as McAdam (2001: 225) has put it, "as the inevitable byproduct of more
general mobilization processes." Jasper (1997: 217), however, has made the
important point that this is not the case in other fields: "Among political
scientists and psychologists, biographies of protest leaders have remained
popular even whüe, under the speü of structure and rationaUsm, sociologists
rejected this source of understanding."
2. Poütical scientists have also traditionaüy been rigid in their insistence that
movement leaders must be affiliated with movement organizations. Eorty
years ago, Roche and Sachs (1969) distinguished between leaders who are
"bureaucrats" and those who are "enthusiasts." This fundamental distinction
survives, in various forms, in both the political science and sociological
üteratures on movement leadership, whether it has been termed "task-
oriented" versus "people-oriented", "rationalized" versus "charismatic", or
"self-effacing" versus "self-aggrandizing" (see Aminzade, Goldstone, and
Perry 2001). Both tjrpes of leader, however, were assumed by Roche and
Sachs, and by the overwhelming majority of subsequent researchers, to be
affüiated with at least one SMO.
3. For a notable exception, see Ganz (2009).
4. In addition, Kevorkian was neither an "entreprerieur" (Kleidman 1986;
Staggenborg 1988) nor a "celebrity" (Gitün 2003) proper, as scholars have
defined these types of movement leader.
5. This üst should be contrasted with those leaders of the Revolution who were
affuiated with an organization; namely, the Sons of Liberty. These men
included John and Samuel Adams, Paul Revere, and John Hancock. In my
view, the fact that some of the "Eounding Fathers" were affüiated with a
formal organization whüe most were not only serves to ülustrate my point
that membership in an organization should not be a prerequisite for being
recognized as a movement leader. For if we continue to argue that it should
be, then the Adams cousins. Revere, and Hancock wül be rightfuüy thought of
as leaders whüe Washington, Jefferson, Paine, Franklin, Madison, Monroe,
and the rest wül not.
6. Again, for an important exception, see Ganz (2009).
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